










It is reasonable to suspect that Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative implies 
that his moral theory is irremediably hostile to the ends of any enlightened environmental 
agenda. Certainly, with his speciesist injunction against the treatment of ourselves and other 
people merely as means to ends, Kant appears to insist that human worth, and human worth 
alone, should delimit one’s range of permissible actions. Because only people can capture 
courses of action under concepts, articulate self-legislating laws using these concepts, and 
freely choose to obey (or defy) these laws, only people can populate the Kingdom of Ends. Even 
if this tension exists, however, it might not be an irreconcilable one. Three strategies for 
resolving it have been recurrent in the literature. In what follows, I promote a fourth. On this 
account, our obligations to nature stem from the value that aesthetic appreciation has as a 
proving ground, of sorts, for moral judgment.1 Treating this as a broadly empirical claim, I test it 
introspectively via appeal to Kant’s writings as well as to the phenomenological expertise 
exhibited by the work of one of the most insightful nature writers of the 20th century.  
Note, however, that I do not offer this account primarily as an exercise in Kantian scholarship. I 
offer it as one to which I suspect Kant would be largely sympathetic, except in some regards 
which I note along the way. Irrespective of Kant’s sympathies, however, I find the theory 
presented here to be suggested by a number of central Kantian insights. And, much more 
importantly, I take it to be plausible on its own merits.  
Note also that several objections are likely to occur to the reader throughout the following 
exposition. (In particular, the reader may wonder why the terms of this account promote such a 
circuitous route to morality through aesthetics). For flow of exposition, however, I relegate my 




1 I owe my familiarity with this general type of strategy to Matthew Altman, on whose paper, “The Convergence 
Between Kant’s Anthropocentrism and an Environmental Ethic,” I commented on at the 12th Annual Inland 
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2. Kantian Aesthetics 
As noted above, there are at least three alternative remedies for the tension of concern in this 
paper. One is to argue that some animals are, in fact, rational enough to merit moral respect, 
making them persons in a Kantian sense. Another is to argue that we should treat non-human 
nature kindly because the failure to do so threatens to poison our natural sympathies for fellow 
human beings (an argument which Kant himself explicitly provides). A third is to argue that 
environmental concern is obligated because it promotes the preconditions of our own and 
others' rational agency. A discussion of these provides useful background for what follows, but 
to stay on point, I address them in an extended footnote.2 Note that I have no interest in 
 
2 What are these three alternative strategies in detail, and why should we doubt their conclusiveness? Consider the 
first. Perhaps we can argue that some animals, in fact, are rational enough to merit moral respect, making them 
persons in a Kantian sense. For our purposes, however, this approach fails along two dimensions. First, it's 
prohibitively narrow; and second, it's something of a non sequitur. It is too narrow because it endeavors to cover 
only animals, and presumably only some animals at that (e.g., dolphins, chimps, elephants, etc.), thereby ignoring 
most of our furred and feathered, let alone our leaved and needled, terrestrial cohabitants. It is a non sequitur 
because the rationality it extends to cogitative animals is not the type at issue. Even if we are forced to recognize 
that many animals do indeed possess discernable problem-solving skills, this is not enough to situate them within the 
Kingdom of Ends. For Kant, such placement arises from a capacity for moral reasoning, not merely from a capacity 
for reasoning more generally. Thus, even a poker playing dog discarding his three of diamonds on the advice of 
disjunctive syllogism need not know how to apply the Categorical Imperative. 
Consider the second of our three strategies. Perhaps we can argue that we should treat nature kindly because the 
failure to do so threatens to poison our natural sympathies for other human beings. This is a strategy which Kant 
himself endorses, and is thus Kantian rather than neo-Kantian. (Kant, 1997, 212 (27: 459) Like that above, however, 
this strategy fails along two dimensions. It is prohibitively narrow since it offers us less than we seek: activist 
environmentalism (generally) stems from more than a mere concern with animal suffering. We worry about animals' 
(continued existence, just as we worry about giant sequoias' continued existence, for which pain is not even an issue. 
For another thing, we are likely to bolt at the idea that our injunctions against animal cruelty rest on anything as 
psychologically contingent as such cruelty's alleged propensity to promote cruelty toward people.  
Suppose that we could remove this connection through conditioning. Or suppose that this connection could be 
modified to human advantage, so that the torturing of squirrels, for instance, rendered us kinder toward people. In 
both cases, it seems, we might still maintain that our present discomfort at the thought of animal torture should not 
disappear as a result. 
Finally, let's consider the last of our three preliminary strategies. Perhaps we can argue that we should treat nature 
kindly because we are obligated to promote the preconditions of our own and others' rational agency. Because so 
many of these preconditions are environmental (e.g., we must breathe and eat to live and think), we have an indirect 
obligation to nature. On this account, our obligations to people generate our obligations to the earth, but only insofar 
as environmental degradation threatens to restrict peoples’ exercise of reason. (Altman, 2008). Note that this 
strategy is superior to the preceding two in at least one respect. It avoids their problematic scope restrictions by 
taking account of our attitudes toward trees and many lower, marginally-sentient forms of animal life. 
Unfortunately, it also encounters a completely different kind of scope complication which proves very hard to shake. 
This complication arises the moment we ask about the moral status of future generations. Do future generations of 
humanity merit consideration in the way currently existing generations do? If not, the threat is obvious. Suppose we 
could reliably predict (contra reality) that climate change threatens the existence, not of us or our children or our 
children’s children, but of our progeny twelve generations down the line? What would then keep us from using high-
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dismissing any of these strategies as canards. My aim in this paper is to supplement these 
strategies for two reasons. One is that the most direct alternative to these strategies, a tack 
which takes the natural world to have intrinsic moral value irrespective of whether it enjoys 
rational status, may not be acceptable to everyone. Thus, I take a different line entirely. 
Another is that the three strategies itemized above fail to prohibit the full range of irresponsible 
ecological behavior which we should want to rule out. They do not capture the full range and 
scope of our felt injunctions against environmental abuse. So, where else might we look in the 
Kantian corpus to identify grounds for our felt belief that nature merits kindly treatment? I 
develop an alternative account which I take to be inspired by Kantian observations, irrespective 
of whether it is an account which Kant himself would fully endorse. 
Despite the acknowledged anthropocentrism of Kant's ethics, it is easy to recognize that within 
the overall Kantian corpus, a reverence for nature enjoys a quite secure footing. One reason for 
this is that Kant sees in the aesthetic experience of nature a parallel to moral judgment. In the 
Critique of Judgment, Kant writes of how a concern for “pure” natural beauty (henceforth, 
“natural beauty”) may illustrate the way judgments of beauty (henceforth, “aesthetic 
judgments”) may resemble moral judgments.3 Since both types of judgment legislate for 
themselves rather than being subjected to a heteronomy of laws of experience, the pleasure 
accruing from aesthetic judgments is parallel to the products of moral consciousness (§59). 
Moreover, since aesthetic judgments of beauty stem from the way the perceived intelligibility 
of an item’s design makes one feel, beauty can be said to give sensible form to moral ideas, 
providing us with a model with which to understand the latter in terms of the former. In short, 
aesthetic and moral judgments share crucial formal similarities. Consequently, an interest in 
 
seals for sport, winning extra points for those with really big eyes? The problem, of course, is a close variant of 
Derek Parfit’s exposition of the “non-identity” problem. (Parfit 1982; 1987, 363). Parfit’s concern is to determine 
how are we obliged to behave toward the citizens of far futurity whose very existence or non-existence is 
determined by our present actions? 
Kant himself is careful to make clear that his concern "does not go beyond the purely moral and rightful relations to 
be found among human beings during life. Someone who, a hundred years from now, falsely repeats something evil 
about me injures me right now," when the injured party exists. Such an account of harm is hardly extendable to 
cases of future human beings since the very dilemma posed by Parfit stems from the fact that it is our present actions 
which create or fail to create these very same future generations. If our irresponsible stewardship of the earth keeps 
potential people from ever existing, then there will never be future individuals subject to harm. It makes all the 
difference in the world that the dead have a track record of having already lived. (Kant 1966, §35). 
3 Strictly speaking, Kant distinguishes between judgments of “beauty” and those of “pure beauty,” reserving the 
latter term for judgments derived from feelings of approval that stem from sensory stimuli or satisfaction alone. 
Thus, a scoop of gourmet French vanilla ice cream could never be judged “purely” beautiful on Kant’s account, 
irrespective of how good it may taste (§3). It is because I am not concerned with examples of impure beauty in this 
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natural beauty serves to indicate “a good soul” and a “mental attunement favorable to moral 
feeling.” (§42) 
To flesh out such passages, let us focus on two specific ways in which aesthetic and moral 
judgments are similar on Kant’s telling. The first is their reliance upon a stance of personal 
disinterest, a stance which takes two distinct forms in aesthetic judgments. We feel pleasure in 
the contemplation of beautiful objects, but of a kind which requires interest in neither the 
object’s actuality nor in its usefulness.4 Thus, to find an object beautiful, we can neither will 
that it be nor will that it be our own. In this respect, the beautiful prepares us to love something 
disinterestedly (General Remark following §29). Two points merit special emphasis in this 
connection. The first is that one’s disinterest in a beautiful object’s actuality and one’s 
disinterest in its usefulness stand in close relation for Kant, since if one has a desire for an 
object, then one has the desire that the object be a reality (Wicks 2007, 21). The second is that 
it is important to Kant’s programmatic purposes that aesthetic judgments display both types of 
disinterest. If aesthetic judgments are to occupy a distinct domain within Kant’s philosophy, 
they must be different from both theoretical judgments (concerning objects’ worldly existence) 
and practical judgments (concerning objects’ relations to our desires and interests). 
The second way in which aesthetic and moral judgments are similar on Kant’s telling is that we 
attribute necessity and universality to both. (Herein, I treat these two features largely in the 
same breath.) “What we have in mind in the case of the beautiful is a necessary reference on its 
part to delight” (§18). And, being necessary, we feel that it should automatically apply to all.5 
Kant explains this felt necessity as follows: 
[S]ince the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other 
deliberate interest) … he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions 
to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence, he must regard it 
as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore, 
he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from 
everyone. (§6) 
Since people issue their judgments of natural beauty from a stance divorced from any particular 
 
4 Note that only in the latter respect does the disinterest characteristic of aesthetic judgments parallel that 
characteristic of moral judgments. This is because the sense of approval associated with judgments of moral 
goodness is directed upon the performance of actual right action. Aesthetic judgments are different. Because the 
sense of approval associated with them stems from the feelings elicited by objects’ apparent intelligibility of design, 
it simply doesn’t matter whether these objects are real or merely apparent (Kant 1988, §4). 
5 There has been significant scholarly debate as to whether this connection is one of strict implication. Note that we 
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set of idiosyncratic interests, they automatically regard themselves as representative of all, and 
thus conclude that others should share their judgments. In short, to judge objects beautiful, we 
must not view them in instrumental, parochial, or contingent terms. To perceive an object as 
beautiful is to react to it as both of value for something other than the goods it promotes (the 
disinterest aspect) and as properly commanding a similar reaction from every competent 
viewer (the necessity/universality aspect). 
As we all know, however, paraphrasing Kant is dangerous. In the present case, danger stems 
from a critical qualification he imposes: we are unable to justify the perceived 
necessity/universality of our judgments of beauty through reference to an articulable rule. 
It is not an objective theoretical necessity such as would let us cognize a priori 
that everyone will feel this delight in the object that is called beautiful by me. 
Nor yet is it a practical necessity, in which case, thanks to concepts of a pure 
rational will in which free agents are supplied with a rule, this delight is the 
necessary consequence of an objective law, and simply means that one ought 
absolutely (without ulterior object) to act in a certain way. Rather, being such a 
necessity as is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be termed 
“exemplary.” In other words, it is a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment 
regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation. (§18) 
So, aesthetic judgments, being ones of “subjective universality,” make no pretense of capturing 
beautiful objects under specifiable concepts which are themselves related to objective features 
that make all beautiful objects beautiful in accordance with specifiable laws. And yet the 
spectator, in judging the object beautiful, still feels forced to believe on some level that no 
judging agent who genuinely has his wits about him could fail to recognize said beauty. In this, 
the perceived necessity/universality of aesthetic judgment differs greatly from that of both 
moral and theoretical judgment. When perceived as universal, it is also recognized, at some 
level, to be, merely “exemplary” or “regulative.” 
 
3. Eco-Phenomenological Strategy 
What is important about the preceding considerations for present purposes is the alternative 
strategy they suggest for mitigating the potentially destructive environmental impacts of Kant’s 
seeming anthropocentrism. What these considerations recommend is that the aesthetic 
contemplation of nature may provide us with practice for the exercise of detached and 
(seemingly) necessary/universal judgment, thus giving us familiarity with the stance from which 
something very much like moral judgment proceeds. Even though only people may be of 
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ability to assume the kind of evaluative perspective for which the Categorical Imperative tests. 
And if this is true, then an indirect duty to the environment may begin to smoothly and 
naturally emerge: the aesthetic contemplation of nature is of value because it empowers those 
faculties through which we recognize the moral worth of other people. Note, however, that this 
is a modest claim. I do not maintain that the concept of beauty (or even those of beauty and 
sublimity together) allows us to express all the concerns of aesthetics, let alone of 
environmental ethics. 
There are two distinct but related inquiries commended by such a strategy. Both of these 
questions fall within the domain of “eco-phenomenology,” a discipline through which we 
endeavor to study the human experience of the natural world and “recover our moral sense of 
our humanity” by recovering “the moral sense of nature first” (Kohak 1984, 13).  The first 
inquiry regards the accuracy of Kant's phenomenological theory. Is his account of our felt 
experience of nature accurate?  The second question regards the relation between said 
experience and our capacity to acquire a competent moral stance. I address these two 
questions in the remainder of this paper. The relation between them is the one described 
above: if Kant’s phenomenological account of our experience of natural beauty is accurate, 
then such experience shares essential formal commonalities with our moral perceptions of 
people (e.g., detachment and perceived universality/necessity). Thus, it provides us with an 
opportunity to practice judgment in accordance with those formal features which otherwise 
guide our faculty of moral judgment. 
            
4. A Case Study: Loren Eiseley’s "Concealed Essay" 
Loren Eiseley (1907-1977), trained as a physical anthropologist, was an essayist on a par with 
Emerson and Thoreau. But unlike them, he wrote poetry in the cadences of scientific prose. His 
most recurrent organizing theme was 20th century evolutionary theory. His self-described 
genre was the “concealed essay,” through which he humanized scientific explanation through 
the resources of personal anecdote. The narratives he relates are reflections upon his 
interactions with nature; his questions concern these interactions’ significance. Very specific 
memories of sights and sounds and smells and feels occasion the thoughts that fill his essays, 
thoughts that Eiseley often casually tosses off without explanation, only to return to later. The 
felt beauty and sublimity of natural objects and the unfathomable spatio/temporal expanses of 
nature as a whole are phenomena that Eiseley constantly endeavors to articulate. In doing 
these things, Eiseley practiced ecophenomenology long before the subject acquired a name. 
In the interest of focus, I use a single essay of Eiseley’s as a case study in what follows. This 
essay is “The Bird and the Machine” (Eiseley, 1957a, 179-193). The story it relates is typical 
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writes, 
I suppose their little bones have years ago been lost among the stones and winds 
of those high glacial pastures. I suppose their feathers blew eventually into the 
piles of tumbleweed beneath the straggling cattle fences and rotted there in the 
mountain snows, along with dead steers and all the other things that drift to an 
end in the corners of the wire. (179) 
The setting in which these speculations occur is Eiseley’s breakfast table, where he reads in The 
Times that machines are on the horizon that will prove capable of doing everything that animals 
do, only better, and on command, and in the service of human aims. Eiseley doesn’t doubt this 
claim. He was no animist or dualist or proponent of the sort of mystery-mongering that relishes 
in the eschewal of natural law explanation. Even if the details of sensation and mentation are 
presently unknown, Eiseley expresses little doubt that their ultimate explication, if ever 
forthcoming, will emerge from the resources of physical theory. However, what Eiseley objects 
to is the dismissive tone of the article’s announcement that animals are just machines. Granted, 
he writes, “the cell itself dissolves away into an abstract chemical machine … [and] the wheels 
get smaller and smaller, and they turn more rapidly, [and] when you try to seize it the life is 
gone” (182). Eiseley does not deny that this is an accurate description of reality. He denies the 
inference from this observation, reached by common eliminativist wisdom, that life was 
“[therefore] never there in the first place” (182). Thus, he writes, “I have no doubt that [the 
mechanization of life] can be done, though a mouse harvesting seeds on an autumn thistle” is a 
better sight than “a machine ‘mouse’ running a maze” (182). He also writes, “There is another 
magazine article on my desk that reads ‘Machines Are Getting Smarter Every Day.’ I don’t deny 
it, but I’ll still stick with the birds. It’s life I believe in, not machines” (181). 
These assorted news items lead Eiseley to remember an experience he had as a young 
naturalist that, he says, “forever left him unable to see a bird imprisoned” (183). The lesson he 
learned was preconditioned, he tells us, by “the lesson of time . . . [that] time is a series of 
planes existing superficially in the same universe” (183). He recalls an incident in the Nebraska 
badlands when his tempo had come to match his surroundings. He realized this one day upon 
discovering that he had sat for hours motionless on a ridge next to a large, coiled rattlesnake. 
“How long he had sat with me I do not know. I had not frightened him. We were both locked in 
the sleepwalking tempo of the earlier world baking in the same high air and sunshine” (184). 
These lessons of time are the stock in trade of ecophenomenology at its best. As David Wood 
writes, such instruction promises to make the “invisible” visible by trading sensory snapshots 
for the experience of nature as a process through time that occurs at its own natural pace 
(Wood, 2001).  
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its men over several hundred miles to carry on research more effectively. Eiseley’s main goal 
was to find fossils. But, in addition to this, he had been told to secure living things: “birds, 
reptiles, anything” (Eiseley 1957a, 186). Speculating that a zoo somewhere required restocking, 
he reasoned that “it was one of those reciprocal matters in which science involves itself. Maybe 
[his] museum needed a stray ostrich egg, and this was the payoff.” Anyhow, his job “was to 
help capture some birds” and “that was why [he] was there before the trucks” (186). 
These instructions led Eiseley to explore a deserted cabin with a hole in its roof which offered 
sanctuary to any passing birds seeking temporary shelter or room for seasonal nesting. Entering 
the cabin “like a trained assassin” he climbed a ladder, triggered a flashlight designed to blind 
and paralyze, and reached up and over a shelf, where his hand was quickly clawed and bitten to 
the sound of beating wings (188). 
What he found on the shelf was a pair of sparrow hawks, each about the size of a human fist. It 
was the male, he discovered, that had sunk its beak and claws into his thumb, causing him to 
drop his flashlight, thereby allowing the female, her sight recovered, to escape through the hole 
in the roof. Eiseley was put off balance but quickly recovered. “You might think I would have 
fallen down the ladder, but no, I had a professional assassin’s reputation to keep up, and the 
bird, of course, made the mistake of thinking the hand was the enemy and not the eyes behind 
it” (189). So, with his other hand, Eiseley seized the bird from behind, folding his wings so that 
he was both subdued and secured. The passage that follows next is of particular importance to 
our present concerns. 
The little fellow had saved his mate by diverting me, and that was that. He was 
born to it, and made no outcry now, resting in my hand hopelessly, but peering 
toward me in the shadows behind the lamp with a fierce, almost indifferent 
glance. He neither gave nor expected mercy, and something out of the high air 
passed from him to me, stirring a faint embarrassment. I quit looking into that 
eye and managed to get my huge carcass with its fistful of prey back down the 
ladder. (p. 189) 
What is the sense of embarrassment that Eiseley describes here, brought about by the seeming 
indifference of the bird? How does such embarassment feel and what could it consist in for 
someone with Eiseley’s naturalistic convictions and scientific sophistication? We return to these 
questions below. For the time being, however, let’s continue his story. 
Putting the bird in a box small enough to keep it from injuring itself, Eiseley walked out to 
welcome the arriving trucks, wherein he planned to deposit the captive, with his collection of 
dead bones, for its return to the city where it would spend the rest of its life in a cage. Sucking 
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these things,” he mused. “I had a professional reputation to keep up” (190). The next morning, 
Eiseley awoke and inspected his prize. Holding the hawk in one hand, he felt it situated limply in 
his fingers, with a pounding heart yet still dismissive gaze. “I saw him look that last look away 
beyond me into a sky so full of light that I could not follow his gaze” (190). Then it happened. 
The little breeze flowed over me again, and nearby a mountain aspen shook all 
its tiny leaves. I suppose I must have had an idea then of what I was going to do, 
but I never let it come up into consciousness. I just reached over and laid the 
hawk on the grass. He lay there a long minute without hope, unmoving, his eyes 
still fixed on that blue vault above him. It must have been that he was already so 
far away in heart that he never felt the release from my hand. He never even 
stood. He just lay with his breast against the grass. In the next second after that 
long minute he was gone. Like a flicker of light, he vanished with my eyes full on 
him, but without actually seeing even a premonitory wing beat. (191) 
Now, whatever is or isn’t happening here, Eiseley clearly takes the incident to be of enormous 
evaluative significance. But what went on in the period between capture and release? What 
change of attitude did Eiseley experience toward himself and the bird that gives the above 
passage its transcendent character? To answer this question, let’s consider both features of our 
experience of natural beauty that Kant identifies: disinterest and felt “subjective” 
universality/necessity. In doing this, I believe, we find that Kant's theory describes, albeit 
imperfectly, some important features of any enlightened ecological sensibility. 
Of these two themes, Kantian disinterest looms larger. Broadly understood as the idea that one 
has no interest at all in whether the object of beauty even exists (whereupon “[a]ll one wants 
to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to [one’s] liking, no matter how 
indifferent [one] may be to the real existence of the object”), the parallel between Kantian 
theory and Eiseley’s phenomenological musings is clouded (Kant 1987, §2). On one level (the 
one that Kant explicitly has in mind), Eiseley, in his essay, indicates deep concern that the hawk 
exist, both for its own sake and, as we will see, for the lessons of perspective it teaches him.  
However, on another level there is a more nuanced sense in which Eiseley, in his essay,  does 
express existential disinterest in the hawk: Eiseley cares very little about whether the hawk 
exists as part of accessible human reality. Call this “mitigated” existential disinterest. Although 
this notion lacks the theoretical purity of Kantian existential disinterest simpliciter, it allows us 
to express a critical distinction between Eiseley’s attitudes and the attitudes of those who 
would presumably prove tone deaf to his phenomenological appeals. In doing this, it marks an 
important difference between those who are likely to experience the pull of the kind of account 
I seek to provide and those who are likely to be left cold by it. Invoking this notion, we can 
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aside, should we care about hawks or kiwis or bumblebee bats or hooded seals or Sumatran 
rabbits or hooded astor plants which we never have occasion to encounter in lived experience? 
This question provides us with a crucial gauge of environmental sentiment. For, it is the 
question of whether the mere knowledge that other species exist is a source of aesthetic 
delight, irrespective of whether they exist visibly to us or “beyond the eyes of men” (Eiseley 
1957a, 192). Many people couldn’t care less whether leatherback turtles, blobfish, basking 
sharks, and Rafflesia flowers go extinct since these are beings with which they never interact. 
Eiseley’s sentiments clearly differ. The account he gives is one on which the aesthetic force of 
our apprehension of the natural world is not a function of whether the denizens of said world 
cohabit the day-to-day realm of that one particular species of primate which happens to 
worship at the alter of daily oral hygiene. Aldo Leopold expresses this same idea in similar 
terms. He dubs people who have no care for those parts of the natural world they do not 
themselves encounter “trophy-recreationists.” For them, regions of the world they “cannot 
personally see [have] no value to [them],” “unused hinterland is [of] no service to society,”  and 
blank spots on maps are “useless wastes” (Leopold 2013, 2169). Leopold finds this attitude 
unfathomable and rhetorically asks: “Is my share in Alaska worthless to me because I shall 
never go there? Do I need a road to show me the arctic prairies, the goose pastures of the 
Yukon, the Kodiak bear, the sheep meadows behind McKinley?” (Leopold, 2013, 2169). 
The idea that the majesty of the natural world is partly a result of its endurance beyond the 
range of normal human perceptual activity is a recurrent theme in Eiseley’s writings. In “The 
Judgement of the Birds,” for instance, he expresses special delight in knowing that pigeons fly 
between Manhattan towers before people have even awoken, and in knowing that orb spiders 
spin webs within the hoods of street lamps above our notice as we walk beneath them, lost in 
the contemplation of our day-to-day affairs. It is the very fact that the human and natural 
realms intersect occur so rarely which makes the shift in perspective resulting from such 
“interpenetrations of worlds” such a transforming experience (Eiseley 1957b, 169). 
A related recurrent Eiseleyan theme is that the majesty of this world is also often a function of 
its endurance beyond the range of normal conceptual activity. Remember Eiseley’s expression 
of “embarrassment” upon capturing the hawk. It is because the bird stares through him with 
indifference with no expectation of mercy that Eiseley feels forced to avert his eyes. The hawk 
acts out of simple instinct, whereas Eiseley acts out of a self-interested imperative to fulfill a 
professional contract. Thus it is that he perceives his own “large carcass” descending the 
ladder: the lack of grace he ascribes to himself is not merely physical. This, I submit, is a 
common enough human reaction to the sensed dignity of majestic animals. They can make us 
feel embarrassed by the very fact that our self-serving deliberative rationality renders us so 
capable of dissimulation even to ourselves, empowering our capacity to justify almost anything. 
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possess. Hawks defend their mates and attain seemingly stoic manners in the face of capture as 
a matter of mere hawk nature, whereas we often do such things only after concerted effort and 
self-training, congratulating ourselves and “expecting mercy” for our efforts every step of the 
way. Our appreciation for majestic animals partly consists in the fact that these creatures 
occupy a region not merely outside our observational realm, but outside our conceptual realm 
of reason-giving as well. I recognize that this phenomenological aspect diverges sharply from 
the spirit of Kant's account of moral virtue as conscious, self-disciplined deference to duty 
alone. However, I take this to provide us all the more reason to view the value at issue in these 
cases as directly aesthetic, rather than moral. 
This idea, that the recognition of the majesty of the world requires recognition of nature’s 
existence beyond the range of normal human perceptual and conceptual activity, is a recurrent 
theme in religious wisdom literature. Consider God’s extended monologue in the Book of Job 
(as opposed to the tale’s familiar and facile framing device  – which scholars generally take to 
have been added long after the story’s original composition – in which God’s good servant loses 
all his stuff but then gets it back in the end for having been such a good sport (McKibben 
2005)). The most surprising thing about this monologue is that it makes little mention of human 
beings, but focuses instead upon the panorama of the natural order beyond the range of 
human acquaintance and comprehension. For the most part, people are noted only for their 
absence from places in the world over which God displays care, as when we are asked “[w]ho 
hath divided a watercourse for the overflowing of waters, or a way for the lightning of thunder; 
to cause it to rain on the earth, where no man is” (King James Version, Job 38:25), or when we 
are asked “[w]ilt thou hunt the prey for the lion, or fill the appetite of the young lions, when 
they couch in their dens and abide in the covert to lie in wait,” or when we are asked, “[w]ho 
provideth for the raven his food when his young ones cry unto God, [and] wander for lack of 
meat” (King James Version, Job 38:39). To appreciate the natural realm, we must recognize the 
existence of gardens beyond our ken and appreciate the feeding of both carrion eaters and big 
cats who, at the time, still had odd occasion to occupy the penthouse of the food chain by 
dining on human flesh.  
When Kant’s “disinterest” condition is more narrowly construed as the idea that an object is 
beautiful if we perceive its delightfulness without regard to any interest, that is, as the proviso 
that one’s delight in the object remains entirely independent of one’s instrumental ends (“that 
[one] can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions to which his subjective self might 
alone be party”), the parallel between Kant and Eiseley is not clouded at all (Kant 1988, §6).  
Such pragmatic disinterest plays a paramount role in helping us understand what goes on in 
Eiseley’s passage. It is the mode of becoming through which we may best understand Eiseley’s 
transition from a trained “assassin” performing a commercial exchange to one who acts for no 
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passing breeze and gently shuddering aspen. On Eiseley’s description, he comes to perceive 
himself as an element of an evaluative context within which his personal instrumental concerns 
lose their normative relevance. 
Leaving disinterest behind, what can we say about perceived necessity/universality? One of the 
interpretive assumptions I implicitly make above is that Eiseley’s felt sense of objective demand 
is best understood in terms of the notion of “fitness” (or, better, “fittingness”).  He describes 
the gentle breeze and shuddering aspen as though they are part of a larger matrix that calls 
upon him to recognize the hawk as of value for more than the position it potentially serves 
within a context  of professional and commercial exchange. This notion of “fittingness” has a 
long history in metaethics, appearing first in the work of Samuel Clark, only to be lampooned by 
Benthem and pretty much buried until the 20th century. In recent decades, Maurice 
Mandelbaum is one of the few analytic philosophers who have discussed it at length. Since it is 
precisely the phenomenological aspects of peoples’ felt perceptions of “fittingness” that are of 
present concern to us, let us turn to Mendelbaum’s account. (Mendelbaum, 1969) 
For Mandelbaum, when we ascribe “fittingness” to our natural sympathies toward an action we 
refer to a phenomenally objective relational characteristic which we sense as an external 
demand on our attitudes or actions resulting from the environment in which we find ourselves 
(Mandelbaum 1969, 61). Here, the notion of “environment” covers all the pertinent initial 
conditions which might call forth action. On this telling, “all cases in which an agent experiences 
a moral demand presuppose an apprehended relation of fittingness” (67). Moral demands are 
perceived in terms of successes or failures to satisfy fittingness relations. Moreover, and 
interestingly for our purposes, so are aesthetic demands. Thus, on Mendelbaum’s account, just 
as a failure to come through on a promise may fail to fit the situation in which it occurs morally, 
a failure to complete a segment of a non-representational figure may fail to fit a geometric 
figure constructed up to that point. 
Mendelbaum’s locution of “fittingness” helps explain why Eiseley’s felt sense of 
universality/necessity should be, à la Kant, merely “subjective.”  For Kant, remember, our 
attributions of necessity/universality to judgments of aesthetic beauty feel right despite their 
failure to enjoy the authority conferred by specifiable justifying rules. It is for this reason that 
he calls such judgments merely “regulative,” or “exemplary.” Our experience of these 
judgments is such that they seem to demand assent by all in virtue of “exemplifying a universal 
rule incapable of formulation” (Kant 1988, §18).  On Mendelbaum's account, this list of 
contextual features is unmanageably large. It includes "not merely the present conditions that 
we find ourselves confronting, but those past and future events which we recognize as being 
relevant to the choices which we are to make” (Mendelbaum 1969, 61). I suggest that it is this 
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and actions occur which explains our inability to articulate rules with which to matter-endingly 
justify the specific attitudes and actions we find appropriate to our dealings with nature. It is 
because of our recurrent concern that there may be computational leftovers which we have not 
considered that we are left with an aftertaste of uncertainty when we form aesthetic reactions 
to our surroundings. Much as we may worry that our Kantian maxims of action may be too 
narrowly described (e.g., anyone (and only those) lacking my DNA should refrain from treating 
others with cruel disdain), we may also worry that we have not grasped the larger picture when 
forming our aesthetic reactions to our natural surroundings.6 Mosquitos may strike us as mere 
pests until we note the role they play in feeding birds, spiders, dragonflies, and frogs. A zebra’s 
painful death at a lion’s paws and teeth might strike us as ugly until we recognize its role within 
an African veldt ecosystem forged by subtle evolutionary interactions across immense spans of 
time. Natural events often only become beautiful to us as a function of our increasing 
recognition of the systematic roles they play within the wholes of which they are parts.  
Remember that we are concerned with two issues in this paper. The first regards the accuracy 
of Kant's account of our experience of natural beauty. The second regards the connection 
between said experience and our acquisition of a competent moral stance. In our use of 
Eiseley’s essay so far, our dealings have only been with the first, as I have argued that many 
(but not all) of Kant's contentions concerning the experience of natural beauty are plausible, 
and that what largely makes them plausible is the role of perceived "fittingness" as a primitive 
feature of said experience. Let’s now turn more explicitly to the second issue. What of the idea 
that interest in natural beauty serves to indicate “a good soul” and “mental attunement 
favorable to moral feeling,” providing us with practice using those very faculties required for 
moral judgment? (Kant 1988, §42) In dealing with this question, we can address some emerging 
objections. To these ends, let’s return to Eiseley’s story. 
Remember where we left our two heroes. Eiseley had just released the captured hawk on an 
impulse he couldn't articulate. A bit previously in the essay, Eiseley had wondered where the 
female hawk had gone, the one who had escaped his capture the night before. "Probably in the 
next county by now," he cynically thought.  But now, following the male hawk's ascent, Eiseley 
comes to realize something, when "from far up somewhere a cry came ringing down" (Eiseley 
1957a, 191-192). 
I was young then and had seen little of the world, but when I heard that cry my 
 
6 I don’t mean to suggest here that we need feel uncertainty at the times our aesthetic reactions emerge. At these 
moments we may feel doubtless certainty that these reactions are appropriate. Typically, I suspect, it is only after the 
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heart turned over. It was not the cry of the hawk I had captured; for, by shifting 
my position against the sun, I was now seeing further up. Straight out of the 
sun’s eye, where she must have been soaring restlessly above us for untold 
hours, hurtled his mate. And from far up, ringing from peak to peak of the 
summits over us, came a cry of such unutterable and ecstatic joy that it sounds 
down across the years and tingles among the cups on my quiet breakfast table. 
I saw them both now. He was rising fast to meet her. They met in a great soaring 
gyre that turned to a whirling circle and a dance of wings. Once more, just once, 
their two voices, joined in a harsh wild medley of question and response, struck 
and echoed against the pinnacles of the valley. Then they were gone forever 
somewhere into those upper regions beyond the eyes of men. (Eiseley 1957a, 
191-192) 
Once again, something very important is going on here for Eiseley. Let’s try to say what that is 
without lapsing into tempting Hallmark card sentimentality.  
What this episode brings about in Eiseley is a shift of perspective which further pulls the rug out 
from under the complacency and myopia that had girded his prior assessments of value. What 
it reminds him of is that there are larger narratives to be constructed (which we need not 
articulate in either teleological or intentional terms) to which he had conveniently blinded 
himself in his efforts to conceal his comforting prejudices in pursuit of his professional 
ambitions.7 This is his manifestation of attitudinal disinterest. His perception of the judgment’s 
universality/necessity is revealed by the very efforts he makes to describe his experience in a 
manner that promises to convey its character to the rest of us. Employing the language of 
literature against a background of science, Eiseley presents the contextual panorama against 
which his experience of natural beauty displays “fittingness.” But in conveying his sense of 
wonder upon recognizing a narrative within which his experience takes on a whole new 
meaning, Eiseley effectively illustrates the way broader alternative narratives may always exist 
to be recognized. It is for this reason that we can regard his aesthetic judgment as provisional, a 
matter of mere “subjective universality” dictated by a merely “regulative” principle of aesthetic 
judgment. 
 
7 I have herein little to say about Kant’s own views concerning the role of teleology in our judgments of natural 
beauty. Suffice it to say that I agree with Kant’s apparent contention that organisms and nature itself (viewed with 
an eye toward its regulative principles of systematicity) need not actually be teleological in character. However, I 
disagree with his seeming contention that these items are, in some sense, only comprehensible in teleological terms.  
Granted that such items may recommend or suggest teleological narratives to the imagination, but this is a different 
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It is because such stances of attitudinal disinterest and “subjective” universality/necessity are 
built into our perceptions of actions’ aesthetic fittingness that our experience of the former 
provides us with practice for the formation of moral judgment. This is because morally resonant 
acts toward persons follow from perceived fittingness relations just as aesthetically resonant 
acts toward nature follow from perceived fittingness relations.8 
It is useful to invoke narrative accounts (e.g., Macintyre’s) of our perceptions of value at this 
point. On such accounts, the evaluative dimensionality of our experience derives from said 
experience’s ability to articulate unitary autobiographical stories for ourselves which “link birth 
to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end” (Macintyre 1984, 204). What Eiseley, 
bird in hand, finds confronting him is an opportunity to eschew a commercial exchange for an 
occasion of wonder, by reference to which he mindfully guides his actions following a narrative 
that affirms the rankings of evaluative salience that led him to become a naturalist in the first 
place.  
Moreover, the moral virtue he might be said to act on – humbled non-parochialism – is less 
subject than many candidate virtues to charges of relativism and cultural contingency. It is an 
acquired human capacity which is “internal” to an extremely broad practice common to all, that 
of understanding and negotiating the natural world. Nussbaum writes that one of the capacities 
required for general human flourishing is the capacity “to live with concern for and in relation 
to animals, plants and the world of nature” (Nussbaum 1999, 42). This is plausible. Because 
every human being is part of the natural world, it is arguable that a phenomenological failure to 
recognize our place in this larger setting is no less a defect of the soul than myopia is a defect of 
the eye. 
Judgments of value generally involve the construction and endorsement of narratives. Because 
this is common to judgments of both aesthetic and moral value, practice with the former easily 
leads to a greater facility with the latter. For instance, we may easily imagine how our 
experiences of natural beauty might render us kinder toward other people. Consider a case 
study from the life of another brilliant nature writer. Thoreau, we must remember, did not stay 
at Walden past his experience of spring's transforming power. He moved back to Concord and 
applied the lessons he had learned in solitude to his life as a social being. Foremost amongst 
these lessons was the call to absolution. 
In a pleasant spring morning, all men's sins are forgiven. Such a day is a truce to vice. While 
such a sun holds out to burn, the vilest sinner may return. Through our own recovered 
innocence we discern the innocence of our neighbors. (Thoreau 1965, 280)   
 
8 Where these fittingness relations themselves are possibly best articulated, contra Kant, in the tentative terms 
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Why does this make sense? Why would clemency arise in response to the emergence of buds 
from stems and the arrival of geese from the South? The reason, I suggest, is that to change 
one's heart by attuning to broader narratives about the context in which one lives is often 
tantamount to acquiring a less personal and more disinterested perspective. As Emerson 
writes, it is to lose “all mean egotism” as one “stands on bare ground” with one’s “head bathed 
in the blithe air, uplifted into infinite space” (Emerson 2009, 3). To become aware of such 
broader narratives is to recognize more general evaluative contexts from which our 
assessments of "fittingness" can be made, with the recognition that such awareness could only 
fuel our understanding of those to whom our indignation is directed. To the extent, then, that 
our retributive harshness toward others requires a confined evaluative space from which to be 
launched, the experience of natural beauty, as described by Eiseley and Thoreau, is more than 
likely to inspire an attitude of forgiveness and consequent kindness toward others. It excavates 
our better selves by leading us from anger to empathy.9 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued two things: First, given that three more ubiquitous strategies for defending the 
ecological acceptability of Kantian moral theory collectively prove inadequate to justify the full 
range of our environmental concerns (a claim for which I argue by lengthy footnote), an 
alternative strategy is made available by a neo-Kantian aesthetic account, a strategy which 
promises to pick up some of the implicational slack. Second, using Eiseley’s phenomenological 
observations, we can find a fair amount of introspective empirical support for this strategy once 
we focus on the disinterestedness and “regulative” universality/necessity built into our 
perceptions of “fittingness.” 
Let’s now turn to three possible problems. The first of these is that one might wonder why I 
have chosen to use the notion of the beautiful rather than that of the sublime for the purposes 
of the above analysis, given Kant’s insistence that judgments of sublimity broaden our self-
awareness by prompting us to “measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature” 
(Kant 1988, §28). My reason is the following: on each of the two notions of sublimity that Kant 
considers (mathematical and dynamic), an agent’s experience of the sublime ultimately consists 
in the felt superiority of his own reason (understood as a supersensible faculty) over nature 
(Kant 1988 §28). However, this felt superiority seems to be at variance with many of our 
 
9 Moreover, to become aware of such broader narratives is to acknowledge that our present evaluative assessments 
are provisional, since the contextual factors that we have not recognized may suggest changes in perspective as we 
learn about more and more of them. I would suggest that this does much to explain the merely “subjective” or 
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sentiments concerning nature, including those described in Eiseley’s essay, where a 
recognizable sentiment of awed humility seems to play a more central role. 
A second possible problem for the above account is potentially more serious, as it threatens my 
most fundamental procedural tactics. Why, one might ask, should we view our moral 
sympathies as routed through our aesthetic sensibilities in the case described? After all, Eiseley 
doesn’t explicitly characterize them as such. Why shouldn’t we simply take the sense of 
fittingness which Eiseley experiences as a recognition of moral obligation, rather than as a 
rattling of an aesthetic sensibility, the exercise of which then renders him a more competent 
moral agent? To view the episode in these terms is to circumvent entirely the strategy of 
legitimizing aesthetic sensibility on the grounds that it serves as a prelude to moral sensibility.  
The answer to this question is that I have tried to articulate an account on which we can 
acknowledge the indirect value of natural aesthetic experience, in its capacity as a proving 
ground for the exercise of moral judgment, even if we find it hard to attribute proximate moral 
rights to the likes of hawks, honeybees, and pine trees. That is, I have tried to provide an 
account of the instrumental or indirect moral value of nature (as the object of natural aesthetic 
judgment) which proves effective for those who are dubious about the intrinsic or direct moral 
value of nature. I am personally sympathetic to the idea that Kant’s Kingdom of Ends is the sole 
repository of moral rights (other, perhaps, than the right not to feel pain). This accords with my 
convictions and practices (e.g., I regard “happy meat” as preferable to factory-farmed beef and 
pork, and I take it to be obvious that, when faced with the choice between starving people and 
endangered lemurs, the lemurs should go in the stew pot). Others need not agree with me. 
They need not perceive special moral status in a subject’s ability to capture courses of action 
under concepts, articulate self-legislating laws using these concepts, and then autonomously 
choose to obey (or defy) these laws. I concede that the above account may not be for them. It is 
a backup theory for those of us who are wary about viewing moral value in nature as intrinsic. 
This is the role which I see for the above account, and this concession delimits neither the 
ambition nor the scope I intend for it. 
A third potential objection is the following: Mightn’t we worry that the indirect justification for 
the kindly treatment of non-human nature which I advocate is dangerously contingent?  
Mightn’t we want our felt sense of moral obligation to the natural world to depend on 
something less reliant upon our incidental emotional natures than our aesthetic reactions? 
Mightn’t we worry that it is a mere causal accident that our aesthetic reactions are tied to our 
moral sensibilities in the way I have described? Fortunately, I think that there is a response to 
these concerns. The connection between aesthetic and moral judgment for which I have argued 
is not a causal one, but rather one of similarity or partial identity: the capacities for detachment 
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also. What this means is that to engage in aesthetic judgment is just to rehearse those faculties 
involved in moral judgment. Consequently, no contingent causal connection between the two 
need be supposed. 
In conclusion, let me say something about larger purposes. Even though my explicit purpose in 
this paper is to argue for a fourth strategy for employing Kantian insights to promote 
environmentally responsible action, I have a broader agenda also. I seek to promote Eisely’s 
essays to ecophenomenological researchers as a rich but surprisingly underused resource.  
Eiseley offers much in this connection. He offers insights with which we may tackle not only 
environmental concerns, but “culture war” issues besides. Think, for instance, of the criticisms 
of science which perennially echo through fundamentalist churches and conservative school 
boards in the United States. Naturalism robs the world of value, we are told. It promotes moral 
nihilism and turns us all into machines. Like Einstein, who insisted that life without wonder is 
tantamount to death, Eiseley seeks to remind us that it is in our experiences of non-human 
nature that our detached evaluative faculties, and consequent capacity for normative 
judgment, receive some of their best practice and some of their most delicate fine-tuning. 
To come full circle, these experiences also remind us of how we might agree with the letter and 
yet disagree with the spirit of the newspaper items that frame Eiseley's essay and prompt his 
recollections in the first place. That is, they tell us how it could be that animals are machines 
without being “mere” machines. When Eiseley contrasts birds with potential robotic birds and 
writes "but the machine does not bleed, ache, hang for hours in the empty sky in a torment of 
hope to learn the fate of another machine, nor does it cry out with joy nor dance in the air with 
the fierce passion of a bird," he is not anthropomorphizing (Eiseley 1957a, 192). Nor is he 
lapsing into the obscurantism of Thoreau, who insists that any science which “enriches the 
understanding … robs the imagination” (Thoreau 1962, 155-56). Eiseley is simply noting the 
obvious: a machine, by nature, is built to serve our personal and practical interests; and 
because of this, it can seldom lead us to question these interests. A machine may fly. Indeed, 
many of them do. But we can seldom follow their flight into a luminous sky and have the 
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